American Foreign Policy Investments
American foreign policy has shaped the post-World War II order for two reasons. The United States has made foreign policy investments that supported its endeavors abroad and it has a clear and reflective foreign policy strategy towards emerging and present foreign policy challenges.
During the first years after World War II, the United States was exposed to several important choices and options offered by the existing power settlement and international conditions. Despite the outcome of World War II being defined with the successful performance of the Allied forces in both fronts, the settlement brought the post-war Eurasia market, strong ideological fault lines between the allies. Capitalism and socialism marked the ideological lines between the allies and adversaries of the post-war era.
It was impossible to make coexistence possible for two opposite ideologies. The proof of such an attempt was apparent in the words and deeds of the World War II allies after the Yalta conference. Request of the reparations promised to the Soviet Union during the Yalta conference was hard to justify to the United States society. Allies do not owe anything to the allies who fought the same war despite the loss and sacrifice of human live suffered by the Soviet Union was considerably greater than that suffered by the Americans.
The vision of the United States and the Soviet Union about the post-war order differed too. Europe was a place where hunger, mistrust and devastation were the challenges that looked for the immediate relief and solutions to prevent even greater humanitarian losses. The Soviet Union’s economy was reconstructed to support the war effort and the nation suffered huge human losses. It looked for the assistance and relied upon itself. The United States was the only Ally that entered the post-war era as an economically growing power. It was the only power that had the capabilities to support the reconstruction of Europe. To share the wealth of a society in aid of another nation is difficult to justify to the tax payer. It is even harder to justify the economic bailout of an ideologically adverse power, even if it was a former war ally. Ideological conditions marked the playground for the United States and Soviet Union. Despite nominally there had to be a chance for every nation to choose its way, the oppression and forced spread of ideologies made distinctions between the zones of strategic influence. Diverging ideologies marked the adverse relations between the United States and Soviet Union.
Not only did the United States and Soviet Union hold conflicting ideological views, both nations harbored mistrust and a history of pain between the European nations which limited the options for coalition building. France had fought two wars with Germany and both of them brought devastating consequences to the French. Great Britain had its own vision about the post-war order; it still had strong links with the Commonwealth and its colonies, though it lacked the resources to support its colonial empire. . The European powers had to rebuild their economies, but it could not choose its path alone.
Considering the post-war order, the United States had managed its adverse relations with the Soviets. Washington was facing important choices on how to best contain the ideological threat coming from the Soviet Union. Washington needed allies and European powers needed assistance. The Europeans each had their own vision of post-war Europe and the US’s growing economy and military capabilities meant Washington held leverage and influence over Europe as they could meet the needs the Europeans could not satisfy themselves. Also the Soviets limited the expansion of the strategic influence zones on the grand chessboard called Europe.
To characterize the evolutions of the United States foreign policy and investments made during the cold war, it is important to look at the beginning and the end of cold war Europe and the changing threat perception in the United States. There was a change in foreign policy discourse after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The world order was changing, so changed the United States foreign policy reflecting emerging challenges on both sides of the Atlantic. My analyses will touch upon the investments the United States made during the Cold War period and the evolution of the foreign policy up until the just after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first part of the analyses will be devoted to the Marshall plan that made European economies sustainable. The second part will be devoted to the evolution of the United States foreign policy and its changing character over time. The third part will be devoted to the political support for German unification which occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which changed the balance of power gravity in Europe.
American foreign policy investments during the Cold War: limited option in Europe
“Containment”, the term generally used to characterize American policy toward the Soviet Union during the postwar era, was a series of attempts to deal with the consequences of that wartime Faustian bargain: the ideal was to prevent the Soviet Union from using the power and position it won as a result of that conflict to reshape the postwar international order, a prospect that seemed, in the West, no less dangerous that what Germany and Japan might have done had they had the chance. George F. Kennan coined the term in July 1947 when he called publicly for a “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansion tendencies.”
From the first post-war years, the United States had to find the best means to contain the Soviet Union – one of two parts considered to be won the war. The task was not easy as the European countries were economically and militarily weak. Even if economically European states possessed significant capabilities, mistrust between them would lead to the extension of the war inside Europe, had the United States or the Soviet Union not existed as triggers for reshaping the world order. The Soviets also grew as the rival of the United States and as such were perceived in the eyes of the Americans. With new advanced weapons and, at the end, Americans and Soviets owners of the nuclear might, both nations entered armoring race and ideological competition in all aspects of life. The United States started investing in the foreign policy to balance the adverse Soviet power and its expansion into Western Europe.
First, it was essential to define the United States foreign policy, which was done in according to the way the Soviet Union was perceived in the United States. It is important to note how the Soviet power was portrayed and how the Americans perceived it. At some point there had to be seen a distinction by American society between the aggressive fascist ideology, and communist objectives, which was to revert the power in Europe by converting capitalists democracies or any other non-communist regime to the communist loyal regimes under the Soviet Union. Europe was scared and violated by the past crimes of fascist regimes. So the necessity to eliminate any kind of ascending fascist ideologies should be excluded from Europe or any other region development perspective. That was exactly the challenges seen by the European powers as the sources of mistrust inherited from the history.
A more important and long-term task was to contain communist efforts to expand their zone of strategic influence. Especially at the beginning of the Cold War, there was a sympathy some Europeans saw in the communist (socialist) objectives to develop society and overcome class struggle. Only dilemma was the essence of the Soviet communist regime that was not designed in line with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels vision as depicted in their writings. Not a violent regime that oppressed everyone standing in the way of Stalin’s power, different from the regime Soviet leadership had developed.
Europe could not be armed overnight due to the contrasting views of France, Britain and Germany. For Great Britain saw the United States as a partner to rule the continent. London sought a strategic bond and control over its colonies (despite the capabilities to maintain control over them were limited) with the United States. France saw the British as a strategic partner to contain Germany and keep the Soviets out of the Europe. The French feared not only the recovery of the German ideology, but also German rapprochement towards the Soviets; a fear also shared among the Americans and the British. World War I repercussions towards Germany did not work. Ruhr had to be controlled and observed. The Soviet influence in the East was evident and the Kremlin’s grip over communist political establishments was tight. The United States sought a united Europe as a way to contain the Soviets and the Marshall Plan was constructed as a means to meet that objective.
Europe, after the war, needed immediate assistance to avoid humanitarian breakdown, famine and the expansion of diseases. Europe’s shattered economy and desperate conditions were intensified by terrible weather conditions. War could not shut down the British coal mining industry however the dire weather conditions did. Exactly the comparison best characterized the situation Europeans had to suffer after the war.
The United States was perceived as an ally of the European nations. The information activities in the United States about the conditions Europe suffered and the clarifications of the activities Americans were intended to undertake in Europe, provided fertile ground for the societies on both sides of the Atlantic to support the Marshall plan (sometime called as the noble adventure). Despite the United States seen as an ally and a necessary part to relieve Europe from humanitarian disaster, it is important to emphasize American power as an external factor for consolidation of European states. European states, especially the United Kingdom, were eager to negotiate special agreements with the Americans. With some cases they succeeded. But the objective of the United States to put Europe whole and free on their own feet was the general outline of US foreign policy and the Marshall plan. Paul Hoffmann outlined procedures that were clearly intended to limit bilateral negotiations, concentrate the responsibility in the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and thereby encourage progress toward economic integration and supranationalism in Western Europe.
With the Marshall plan, the United States intended to build an independent capacity in Europe to provide for themselves economically. Of course, interest to maintain control of European markets with significant purchasing capabilities, were within American interests too. A stronger Europe meant a stronger balance against the communist efforts to take over non-communist nations and bring them into the Soviet sphere of influence. Failure of capitalism would be a victory for communism. “The postwar redistribution of economic and military power suggested an emergent geopolitical rivalry. To that the United States and Soviet Union could add the ‘mutually hostile ideological visions ‘of capitalism and communism.” The presence of an external threat also helped to deteriorate the opposition to the Marshall Plan in the United States. In 1946 Soviet attacks on Czechoslovakia was one of the best caveats. At the same time, the Soviets made threatening overtures to Finland, Norway, and Austria. The Soviet Union not only created favorable environment for the Marshall Plan within the United States government, but also created opposition to communism in countries such as France and Italy with strong communist opposition parties. The Kremlin’s Communist regime was not seen as the benign effort to overcome class differences but as the Stalin’s objective to oppress other nations. As such, the communist regime was negatively viewed in the Western communication campaigns all over the Western Europe.
European nations also suffered economic challenges that only the Americans were able to fix. One example was the British balance-of-payments and dollar challenge which Washington succeeded to tackle through the financial assistance the Marshall Planners provided. Britain did twice as much trading with the Commonwealth as it did with Europe after the war, and all of it was done in sterling as opposed to dollars. Thus there were concessions Brits made to favor the bond with the United States. The country was suffering huge dollar deficits because it did not have access to crucial manufacturing resources. The dollar reserve melted as the economy imported more and more manufacturing resources, and production could not compete with the American goods due to the lack of efficiency the United States possessed. Britain, now bailed out received a second favor British when the United States allowed preferential trading agreements with the United States and a devaluation of the sterling by 30,5%. After the double personalized assistance, American officials spoke of the sort of integration that would bring Great Britain into Western Europe at the cost of its “economic links” to the sterling area and the Commonwealth.
Preferential trading agreements and economic assistance to Great Britain caused risk of isolating France. Outside the Commonwealth Countries, only the United States knew of the British decision to devalue its currency 30,5 percent, reducing the par value of the pound from 4,03$ to 2,80$ on September 18 . Like many of the OEEC countries, the French were more concerned about Britain’s “desolidarization” from the continent and the formation of an “Anglo-Saxon” bloc. Perhaps most painfully, the British devaluation had triggered a 25 percent German devaluation. It also meant preferable fiscal conditions for both, Germany and the British in the European markets. In addition the German economy in Ruhr a was recovering faster than expected due to the maintenance of know-how it used to have before and during the war to support its manufacturing and industry. The consequences of the war had destroyed German economic capacity to lesser extent than what was expected.
The thread of decisions the United States, Brits and Germans had taken, left the French a hard choice. French leadership saw to change the scope of the risks to favor French interests. Closer economic and political cooperation with Germany through multilateral institutions was a way forward seen by the French leadership. “Through the Schuman Plan, which Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announced on May 9, 1950, the French sought to break the deadlock in the debate over European integration and German reintegration. They sought to do so in a way that protected their economic and security interests by pooling European coal and steel production under a supranational authority, in which France would participate and through which, share in the development and direction of German industry.” Despite all the ideological and historic perceptions and memory, the French took the crucial step to promote European integration and cease the cooperation deadlock in Europe. They also moved the European power center to the European continent which was welcomed by the American leadership. Britain did not have any other choice than to concede and join the supranational project if they wanted to remain a significant European power.
The British were forced to overcome its willingness to dominate in tandem with the United States when they faced with the potential isolation through the Schuman Plan. There was a third step which had to be taken to take the British to the common European market, which was in opposition with the British vision about the sterling and Anglo-Saxon rule over Europe. The Council of Ministers of the OEEC adopted the treaty establishing EPU on August 18, and it was formally signed on September 19, which made a retroactive beginning that July. The common payments system created favorable trading conditions in Europe and provided a step forward towards the economic integration of the European market.
Despite the limitations for German decision makers to outline their own future development, their outstanding economic performance and the new leadership in the Konrad Adenauer’s person, enabled Germany to recover and become an economic power that would bolster American containment policy in Europe. West Germany became the member of the NATO project, a collective security structure very much welcomed by Europeans to keep the Germans down, Russians out, and Americans involved.
American foreign policy investments post-Cold War: priority spectrum from the beginning of the Cold War till the collapse of the Soviet Union
American foreign policy, during the Marshall Plan implementation, met it’s the first military challenge in the Korean peninsula. Not only the Soviet regime, but also the Chinese communist regime was the challenge faced by the United States. To bolster the United States efforts, Europe had to recover faster and contribute to the American military endeavors faster than the European countries were ready or willing.
Not only was the United States interested in fighting communism, Washington was also reluctant to enter conflicts it would not be able to finance. Spoiling and worsening relations with the Chinese communists was not the objective for the United States. Opposite to that, the Soviet Union’s military activities close to the Chinese border made ideological neighbors adversaries. The Korean War had to have its limits with China as the Marshall chose it to be despite the US military command in the Korean peninsula did not share the same objectives with the politicians in Washington. Truman’s objective was to contain Soviet power no matter which level and aspect it was. Unless we take issue with the present policy there is every indication [that] the Soviet Union will become a bully wherever their interests are involved. Rapprochement of the Chinese and Soviet regimes was seen as the threat but the need to contain both of them was evident. By not pushing too hard in the Korean peninsula, the fragile balance and dignity could be preserved for both the Chinese and American military and regimes.
Vietnam caused lots of financial, military and humanitarian unwanted pledges for the Americans. There were hard decisions taken in the name of the capitalist reputation to refute the communist ideology. At the end, Americans won the Vietnamese hearts and minds with more economic efforts, than bombing their soil and fighting guerilla warfare. It even triggered the competition for the Hanoi sympathy. Soviet dominance at the beginning alongside increasing Chinese economy and military might, caused fertile ground for the two communist regimes to drift apart than to align. That was the major objective of the United States encirclement foreign policy implemented by Johnson’s and Eisenhower’s administrations. Vietnam was the way to contain communist regimes whatever the character of it might be. “Vietnamese at the military or governmental level, while certainly not puppets, while clearly resentful at the extent to which the American had come to dominate their culture, were at the same time terrified at the prospect that the Americans might on day leave. The result was an ambiguous but deep dependency, the extent of which became clear only after the United States did at last withdraw from the war, in 1973.” Even when military means were implemented to preserve strategic zone of influence, the ideological battle between the communism and capitalism in diverse world parts, played the major role.
With the Kissinger-Nixon’s administration came a new foreign policy approach called détente. The United States and Soviet union, both, were heavily armed with nuclear weapons and the use of the weapon had to be contained as it would lead to the rebuilding of entire civilizations from ashes. The consequences of using these tools of the past containment draw for the future of the both rivals made not worth using them. They were an effective deterrent against military action, but the past rhetoric of retaliation or first attack, should the adverse actions take place, had to be substituted with more predictable cooperate initiatives. In an age in which economic measures could counterbalance military strength, in which nationalism could neutralize ideology, there was less need than there once was for the United States to act alone to preserve world order.
Changing approach to the international system did not imply the absence of balance of power. The systems stability during the Kissinger and Nixon administration was seen through multiple economic and military centers that would balance each other out. The system we are enjoying today when Asian powers like China, India and Russia have too much history behind them, changed military and economic positions to align with each other and instead disrupted the self-balancing system between them. The United States presence is there by invitation from Western derivatives such as Japan and South Korea. Not only was it in the interest of Western powers to maintain balances of power between multiple powers, but also “we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hate and threaten its neighbors”.
No matter what the outside Europe missions were, the main partnerships for the United States were still in Europe. NATO had been seen as an efficient tool to address any kind of collective security challenge. But in 1975 Europe viewed the strengthening of an American presence through NATO structures becoming more and more necessary. NATO became one of Kissinger’s concerns in 1974 and 1975, because of his fears of communists in France, Italy, and Portugal entering a coalitions in those countries by constitutional means. Military containment was replaced with the political struggle for domestic political outcomes. Despite the United States neglecting their impact on the formation of foreign governments, evidence, like the case in Chile, witnessed “that the United States could accept only a certain range of political outcomes, even if produced by democratic means. The American commitment to diversity did not extend to the acceptance of governments that might in some way upset the balance of power.”
No matter what the Soviet economic performance was, it was still significant military power that entered Afghanistan –. Also the Prague spring in 1968 did not portrayed the military weaknesses of the Soviet regime in terms of its economic performance and ability to maintain stability in the strategic zone of influence. Reagan’s and Gorbachev’s era showed commitments both governments were willing to take. A willingness to eliminate nuclear arsenal in the United States came from the fear. In the Soviet Union the same initiative came from fear and economic pressure, as the economy was designed to bolster the economic needs only. The Soviet pledge to the military, in terms of the share of the GDP, was much higher than that of the United States. Economic stability became an important aspect of the competition that allowed higher military spending and improvement in case such a need arose. Consequently the most developed economy could afford the best military equipment to contain, balance or encircle the adverse power. Economic interests primarily, but not only, places Europe among the United States most wanted partners.
American foreign policy investments post-Cold War: diverse option for Europe
When the Soviet Union collapsed, new strategic partnerships were made possible for the Western allies. German unification was on the table and from an economic perspective, if would serve the interest of all. Without unification, Europe’s whole and free would not be an option for the Western alliance.
“Main opposition for the German unification came from the Great Britain. Thatcher’s desire to slow down unification was, she claimed, based on the belief that it would undermine Gorbachev and set back détente. However, her statements in 1989-1990 made it clear that her overriding reason was fear that a united Germany would be “stronger than others” and a “very dominant nation”” British desire to dominate the continent was still evident despite the bond with the Commonwealth, which long ago changed to develop closer ties with the United States and Europe. Thus any opposition was seen as the threat to the British foreign policy objective. Similar concerns rooted in Europe’s past, came from France. Mitterrand met with Gorbachev in Kiev in the early nineties. During the meeting Gorbachev emphasized all aspects the French could fear. Moreover Gorbachev sent signals to Bonn stating the red lines for the reconciliation of the post-Soviet era geopolitics. The only power who strongly supported the unification of Germany was the United States. The United States policy towards Germany made it clear that special relations with the Great Britain were becoming less special.
Despite the opposition, the German fate was decided by Germany and not by the European powers. There were social and economic pressures for urgent action. Without unification and reconstruction or recuperation of economic and social assets, West Germany was facing immigration threats from the East. Chancellor Kohl had to face and deal with the social and economic pressures in the East. For West Germany the decision to share their wealth for the sake of the Eastern regions was not a popular notion, but viewed as necessary to equalize short-term inequalities (to avoid migration), synchronize financial system (which was done and called the gift to the Eastern Germany) and to rebuild the Eastern economy to ensure jobs and decrease social tensions. It was a huge challenge as disparities between the two German parts were vast. Kohl’s lack of economic understanding caused some reconstruction drawbacks but the economic strength of the Western part had a strong enough backbone for the German Marshall Plan and for the East Germany. There was a strong feeling in political parties and among ordinary voters, that East Germany was an ugly but necessary keystone in the post-war European mosaic. Reconstruction of East Germany was not only an urgent challenge the Western part had to deal with; it also marked the starting point of the German Eastern Europe market strategy.
Initial assistance pledged to East Germany was a difficult political decision in Bonn and hard pledge for Western German society. But it was the right decision that made the West German economy grow even faster. Increased Eastern spending power made positive effects in Western Germany which channeled back westwards across the Elbe in the form of the higher demand for western goods. This produced GDP growth of 5,7 per cent in West Germany in 1990, the highest rate of expansion since 1969. By stimulating Eastern German economic recovery and growth, the West Germany did itself a favor.
By possessing all the cutting-edge technology and intellectual property, East Germany was buying all the industrial market goods from West German companies. The quality of German production made it a core market for the East German consumption. With such an approach, it was possible, through economic strength, to be in a strong and scarce financial position. After the EMS upsets of autumn1992 and particular the unrest in the summer of 1993 when the franc came under unprecedented pressure, it was evident that France’s strategy had only served to confirm the Bundesbank’s domination of European money. The success was not the only process evident in 1980s and 1990s. The expansion of German companies abroad was a particular feature of the late 1980 and early 1990s, exemplified by Daimler-Benz’s decision to start production in the US, such as the extension of Siemens and Volkswagen activities into central and Eastern Europe and BMW’s takeover of Britain’s Rover car group.
The economic benefits witnessed from the East German unification and subsidizing, the know-how and leadership in technological industries and the strategy of the German companies, outlined the economic foreign policy of the unified Germany. “For corporate Germany, eastern Europe opens a new economic frontier. Six months after the Wall came down Gert Becker, chairman of Degussa chemicals group, admitted: “The markets in the East are a temptation for us.” It was just one of many temptations from which, as reunification dawned, Germany’s partners fervently hoped it would be delivered.”
With the successful economic performance in Germany, there was a concern among the allies about the growing strength and potential for the growth of nationalism in Germany. Allies witnessed the shift of the power gravity in Europe from West to East as the German economic and corporate interests, switched attention towards Eastern European markets. Politically influential, France and Great Britain asserted the whole essence of the integration of Europe and Schuman plan. The objective of the European powers was to move towards a united currency to contain German economic expansion and Germany.
“In April 1990, Kohl underlined the link between Germany and European unity in a joint statement with Mitterrand asserting – implausibly and, it turned out, inaccurately – that economic and monetary union would “become effective” on 1 January, 1993. The Franco-German pronouncement was worked out in secret between the chancellor’s office and the Élysée Palace without the knowledge of the Bundesbank.” The common currency idea was outlined in the Maastricht Plan, among other integration aspects. The inability to make the common payments area effective arise from the lack of coordination and the willingness for Great Britain to “make a bargain” (Britain would join the common financial system by pegging 1 sterling to 2,95DM over the sterling’s value) on the expense of the German D-mark. Still, there was no doubt that the concept of common currency marked the path for the European powers, especially France. “The rejection of the [Maastricht] treaty will not give France more liberty; it will simply allow Germany to act as it desires, without taking heed of its neighbors or its partners without being constrained by any set of common European rules in its role as military, economic, financial, and monetary power in the center of continent.”
The United States has invested huge economic and military resources in its foreign policy that served the interests of the Western derivatives. But most of the investment made had served the United States interests most.
Post-World War II period could be mainly characterized with the reconstruction of the Europe heartland – the Ruhr region which was devastated mostly after the war. For Germany to avoid any kind of reparations (mistake done by the allies after the World War I) there had to be a balance among the European nations and consensus about the development of Europe. With the Marshall Plan financial, advising, and political consolidation through aid, the United States triggered rapprochement between the British, Germans, and French. The European troika was locked into the conditions that did allow deeper integration in terms of institutions and economies for the future to come.
When the Marshall Plan was implemented, the United States foreign policy was devoted to containment of Soviet power, by maintaining the armament balance of the deadliest weapons both nations possesses. The foreign policy discourse could be characterized with the fear the rhetoric brought to the international arena. First to attack or retaliation strategy was evident in the United States and the Soviet Union.
The consequences that nuclear weapons could bring to the Soviets and Americans made nuclear weapons deterrents from aggressions. Despite the rhetoric among some American and Soviet officials to show the might of the nuclear power, there was a willingness to control the use of the weapons and exclude any kind of misperceptions there might be regarding the proliferation and use of the nuclear power.
Détente was the last stage of the American policy which could be characterized with the emphasis on the economic capabilities supporting the might of the nation. The Balance of power still played a major role in the United States foreign policy discourse, but the objective was to maintain the balance between the multiple powers. Then the systems stability would be self-reinforcing. The characteristics of the American foreign policy were the unwillingness to allow adverse political regimes to alter the balance of power. Cases like 1975 Europe (France, Italy, and Portugal) or Chile were the ones that proved the United States strategic endeavors in domestic affairs of those countries.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, mistrust between the European nations was still evident. Brits feared German domination and deterioration of their role as the bridge between the United States and Europe. French fear was rooted in the history of the pain it had shared with Germany. Also the Russian leadership feared the unified German ascendance of new aggressive ideologies. Only the United States supported the unification of Germany that lead to the domino effect and economic unification of Europe through expansion of German enterprises. German economic power increased through economic supportive schemes towards East Germany. The same strategy is still evident in the EU, when German taxpayers are buying Euro bonds from the Southern states. The South, on the contrary, continues to spend sluggishly buying German production as it is the leading industry globally from many aspects of life. There is an interest for Germany in the internal European market and the expansion of the German investments.
Today NATO and the EU are the backbone structures of the Western hemisphere. The United States foreign policy shifter from the military containment to détente and economization of foreign policy and multiple maintenance of power balance. Today, in cooperation with the EU offers, there is a strong leverage to control Eurasian military and economic affairs.
There is too much mistrust between India, China and Russia for them to build the union that could challenge the Western institutions. Ascending or descending economic or military capabilities of those three states in the legacy of their relations context makes all of them misfits for each other. Shifting power among those powers can be adjusted with the presence of the Western institutions.
Latest Russian activities in Ukraine have posed the challenge for the United States to define its foreign policy in Europe. Could it be containment again, the United States could declare this approach as a way to maintain the borders of smaller or bigger states in front of adverse powers? Is it the interest of the United States alone, or should the EU members become more active as their interests are at too at stake? Without sufficient containment policy, it will be hard to address future security challenges in the Eastern Partnership region countries, or in the Middle East. However the United States past foreign policy investments, especially in terms of the new benign German partnerships, gives more options for the West to choose containment or partnership options. The best way for the West to maintain its supremacy would be to consolidate their economic and military cooperation while the moment is not lost.
David Marsh, Germany and Europe: the Crisis of Unity (Revised and Updates Edition, First published by Mandarin Paperback, 1994);
David Marsh, The Bundesbank: the Bank that Rules Europe (A Mandarin Paperback, 1992);
Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and How the America Helped Rebuild Europe (Free Press: New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, 2008);
John Lewis Gaddis, The Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2005);
Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: Ameica Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambride University Press, 1987);
Simon Serfaty, A World Recast: an American Moment in a Post-Western Order (Rowman & Littlefield, 2012);
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crises of Global Power (Basic Books: a Member of the Persus Group, New York, 2012).
 John Lewis Gaddis, The Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 4
 Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: Ameica Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambride University Press, 1987), 162.
 Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and How the America Helped Rebuild Europe (Free Press: New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, 2008), 16.
 Ibid, 154.
 Ibid, 103.
 Michael J. Hogan, 1987, 118.
 Greg Behrman, 2008, 260.
 Michael J. Hogan, 1987, 267.
 Greg Behrman, 2008, 260.
 Michael J. Hogan, 1987, 366.
 Greg Behrman, 2008, 281.
 John Lewis Gaddis, 2005, p.14
 John Lewis Gaddis, 2005, p. 264
 Ibid, p.276
 Ibid, p.293
 Ibid, p. 330
 John Lewis Gaddis, 2005, p. 336
 David Marsh, Germany and Europe: the Crisis of Unity (Revised and Updates Edition, First published by Mandarin Paperback, 1994), p. 44
 David Marsh, 1994, p. 28
 Ibid, p. 83
 Ibid, p. 18
 Ibid, p. 102
 David Marsh, 1994, p. 142
 Ibid, p. 147
 Ibid, p. 149
Publicēts 22. aprīlis, 2014