Freeing Political Prisoners: Lukashenko’s ‘Chess Sacrifice’

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made another smart political move by freeing six (remaining) political prisoners last weekend. Not only Belarus’s neighbours – Latvia and Lithuania – but also Federica Mogherini and Johannes Hahn from the EU, and international organizations like Freedom House[1], were quick to acclaim  this decision as a “long-sought step forward”[2], and more precisely, a “[r]ight step to enhance EU-Belarus ties”[3]. According to unofficial information quoted by the Russian agency TASS, the EU will review its sanctions against Belarus on September 4-5.[4]

Indeed, the EU has set release of political prisoners as one of the main – or even the main – condition for improving relations with Belarus, the only Eastern Partnership country that does not take full membership in the program. At the same time, the EU’s own policy has been balancing between idealistic calls for democracy and more down-to-earth geopolitics, underpinned by a hope that it is possible to reach an agreement with President Lukashenko. The Minsk agreements clearly served to convince even the more skeptical players of the need to cooperate with the incumbent Belarusian regime.

So, a condition has been met – will / should the sanctions be lifted now?

Before answering affirmatively, several points should be thoroughly considered:

First, the EU committed a strategic mistake by giving the issue of political prisoners such a high salience, compared to other, more fundamental and systemic problems that Belarus has with human rights. Political prisoners are not, in fact, a litmus test for Lukashenko’s pro-Europeanness; they are just minor pieces in Lukashenko’s chess game that can be sacrificed if necessary. This time, ‘sacrifice’ evidently came for the sake of new IMF loans, lifting the EU’s sanctions, and balancing Belarusian-Russian political relations by reengaging the EU[5] that would actually strengthen and not weaken Lukashenko’s regime. Lukashenko’s ultimate aim – to maintain his power – is incompatible with true liberalization.

Second, belarusian opposition and civil society are weak, and liberation of six people, only one of whom has a clear political potential, two months before the elections would not endanger the regime. Lukashenko demonstrated this very bluntly – collection of signatures for the candidates finished on Friday, August 21, and the political prisoners were freed on Saturday, August 22. Moreover, being liberated from the jail does not mean getting rid of the state control: as a British governmental report from March 2015 noted, “None of the political prisoners released in 2014 were rehabilitated into society, and some face preventative surveillance and other controls imposed for a prolonged period after they are released.”[6]

Third, the already quoted TASS report also notes that the Russian foreign minister Lavrov “supports normalization of Belarus’s relations with the West”. [7] In its most crucial foreign policy decisions, Belarus traditionally heeds toRussian preferences and demands; Lavrov’s statement also tacitly proves that Belarus did not, in fact, become more “independent”.

Fourth, Lukashenko’s decision thus means a difficult choice for the EU: it cannot maintain the same level of sanctions against Belarus once a major reason for their existence has been eliminated; and it cannot take liberation of six people as a proof of real change in Belarus. The solution for the EU would be to set clear benchmarks: what sanctions were contingent on the liberation of political prisoners, and what remains to be done in other spheres. This is important for Brussels’s credibility and for a common EU policy surpassing the competition among some Member States.

Fifth, at the same time, liberation of political prisoners should not be completely ignored. Belarus is currently subject to proportionally much stricter sanctions than other unfree Eastern Partner states, in particular Azerbaijan, not mentioning influential partners like China. Now, it is a good time to make the EU’s sanctions policy more balanced.

Liberation of the six Belarusian political prisoners shows that Lukashenko has growing concerns about his relations with the European Union – but not in a way the EU would like him to be. This is smart manoeuvring, which is most likely caused by economic and pre-election rationale, rather than indicator of a more fundamental policy shift. As soon as the elections are over, political situation in Belarus can deteriorate even further, especially if the continuing economic difficulties continue to endanger the “social contract” upholding the regime. In general, Belarus is not a predictable and open cooperation partner for the EU, not even in economic relations; as one example, its Heritage economic freedom index declined by 0.3 points over 2014, and this year, it scores  153rd among 178 ranked states.[8] Thus, the EU should take the latest Lukashenko’s decision as another worthy indicator of how the Ukrainian crisis changes Russia’s relations with its neighbours, but not as a reason for U-turn in its own relations with Belarus.