Examining the Kremlin’s and Far-Right Parties Cooperation: Should the EU be Worried?

During the Ukraine crisis, the Russian authorities have often raised concerns about the political forces in Kiev, referring to the new Ukrainian leadership as ‘nationalists’, ‘neo-Nazis’, ‘Russophobes’ and ‘anti-Semites’. The Kremlin’s use of WWII rhetoric in political discourse is not something new. Over the last decade, the Russian leadership has put a considerable amount of work into restoring and promoting Russia’s collective identity, based on the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War. Thus, it was unsurprising when Putin addressed the Russian lawmakers last March. He justified the annexation of Crimea, on the basis of protecting ethic-Russians in the peninsula from bellicose moves of Svoboda and Pravi Sektor.[1] At the same time, the Kremlin’s growing cooperation with the far-right parties across Europe contradicts its vocal antifascist stance, as well as its public disregard for right-wing political forces in the Ukrainian state apparatus. According to the Political Capital Institute, 15 European far-right parties have openly expressed their sympathy towards Russians (see Table). Combining the pro-Russian radical left and right parties in Europe would result in approximately 20% of the European Parliament political parties’ potential support towards Russian policies.[2]  

Source: Political Capital/Human Rights First

For the Kremlin, the following cooperation is driven primarily by opportunistic means rather than by ideology. Through financing the far-right political parties, non-governmental organizations, ‘independent’ experts, media groups and think tanks; the Russian leadership relies on strong lobbying of Moscow’s interest in Europe (especially after right-wing parties’ substantial gains in the last year’s European parliamentary elections). This could legitimize the current political regime in Russia. In extreme cases, the Russian elite aim to destabilize and weaken the EU’s institutional capacity; and hope to bring the Kremlin-friendly governments in the EU Member States, as is the case in Hungary. In recent years, the right-wing populist party - Jobbik - highly increased its presence in the Hungarian government by becoming the third largest party in the country.[3]  At the same time, the close partnership with European far-right parties will not bring results immediately, especially when Russia’s economic capacity has weakened due to the sanctions and revaluing of the rouble. However, in the long-term and in the case of stabilization of the Russian economy, the Kremlin could use this ‘trump-card’ to influence policy outcomes in Europe. On the other hand, far-right parties are interested in close cooperation with the Kremlin. This is not only due to financial gains; there are some signs of genuine affection between the two. This is a result of their shared interpretations of national sovereignty and self-determination, as well as their commitment to conservative Christian values against ‘rampant Western decadence’.[4] Far-right, Euro-sceptic parties are attracted to Putin’s strong statesman image and his independent and confrontational thinking, which is not restricted by political entities, such as the European Union.

In recent years, there have been numerous cases of the Kremlin’s and European far-rights parties’ cooperation in tackling different policy areas. As stated above, the Hungarian populist party; Jobbik, highlights the increasing partnership between the two. Jobbik is known for its anti-Semitic rhetoric and concerns regarding the Israeli ‘colonization’ of Hungary. The party’s rising support could be explained by its criticism of unpopular austerity measures and Hungary’s economic liberalization policies implemented over recent years. Jobbik has also denounced Hungary’s ‘Euro-Atlantic connections’ and the European Union by insisting on - and pushing forward - nationalist economic policies, externally backed by Russia. Furthermore, there have been multiple cases of tracked high level meetings between the party and Russian decision-makers. For example, the meeting between Gabor Vona (Jobbik party president) and Russia Duma leaders, including; Ivan Grachev (chairman of the State Duma Committee for Energy); and Vasily Tarasyuk (deputy chairman of the Committee on Natural Resources and Utilization); among others. In the Ukraine crisis, Jobbik openly supported the Russian side, calling the referendum in Crimea ‘exemplary’.[5] Finally, the party was suspected of receiving financial assistance from Moscow, as seen in the case against MEP Bela Kovacs; who was accused over his cooperation with Russian intelligence.[6]

Moscow’s ties with French extreme-right National Front are also growing stronger. It was recently confirmed that Le Pen’s party would receive a €40m loan from a bank with links to the Kremlin. This loan would cover part of the FN's campaigning expenses, ahead of the national elections in 2017.[7] Moreover, over recent years, Le Pen herself visited Moscow for high-level meetings with State Duma leader, Sergei Naryshkin and Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin. Here, issues of common concern were discussed, such as Syria, EU enlargement and gay marriage. Russia also strengthens its soft-power channels through the financial assistance of media outlets, such as France’s ProRussia TV, which is staffed by editors with close ties to the National Front. They use the station to popularize close to the party’s perspectives and rhetoric on domestic and international politics. The party stands against NATO and the EU. It wishes to replace the organization with a pan-European partnership, which would include Russia and be driven by a trilateral Paris-Berlin-Moscow alliance. In this respect, it is not surprising that the party recognized the results of the Crimea referendum.[8]

Other Kremlin’s partners include the Greek Golden Dawn party, whose members use Nazi symbols and emphasize street fighting. The party has openly expressed its support and cooperation with Moscow; and especially with Russia’s extreme right, from which it received substantial financial funds. Finally, WikiLeaks revealed that the Bulgarian Ataka party has close ties with the Russian embassy. Statements that Ataka receives funding from Russia have been circulating for a while, but no clear verification has been found. However, the party does not hide its sympathy towards the Kremlin and expresses its support on the media. Last year, Radio Bulgaria reported that Ataka’s parliamentary group ‘has insisted that Bulgaria should recognize the results from the referendum for Crimea’s joining to the Russian Federation.’ While, party leader, Volen Siderov, has repeatedly urged Bulgaria to veto EU sanctions targeted at the Russian economy.[9] In addition, all four parties sent their representatives as election monitors to the Crimea referendum (as well as, the Austrian Freedom Party; the Belgian Vlaams Belang party; Italy’s Forza Italia and Lega Nord; and Poland’s Self-Defence), which was coordinated and organized by the Eurasian Observatory For Democracy & Elections - Russia-based NGO in Belgium, specializing in monitoring elections in ‘self-proclaimed republics’ (Abkhazia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh).[10]

The following cooperation between the Kremlin and European far-right parties should be taken seriously by the European Union. Last year revealed the need for rethinking and strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy, especially in relation to Russia. Russia’s partnership with European extreme right is one of the reasons behind driving the divide in the Member States’ policies towards Moscow, resulting in the weakening of the European Union’s institutional capacity. To counter the partnership, more public investigations relating to the external funding of European far-right parties - on the level of the Member States and the EU - could be launched. Additionally, restrictions could be placed on financial assistance from Russia. In the future, it is also important to find the effective mechanisms for increasing and mobilizing voters, especially those who are not willing to participate in European parliamentary elections. Furthermore, it is crucial to better examine the voting behaviour of those who vote for extreme right parties which, in most cases is driven by a dissatisfaction with the immigration system, austerity measures and issues related to national sovereignty.[11]